Executive Summary
Superannuation fees have come under public scrutiny in recent years with the belief that many are set too high. This report focuses on a sample of Australian superannuation funds to gain a better understanding of the factors that influences the fees that they charge. We examine how fund size, asset allocation, risk category and fund type influence investment, administration and total fees. Previous research has not precisely linked the investment fee to the asset allocation of each superannuation fund in Australia. The results reveal that exposure to certain asset classes helps to explain fund fees. Our results show that this difference provides an intuitive reason as to why investment fees differ between funds. After taking into account the asset allocation for each fund, we find convincing evidence that there are differences in the fees charged by corporate funds, industry funds, master trusts and public funds. These fee differences exist across investment, administration and total fees. We find that industry funds charge an investment fee that is over 12 basis points cheaper than a master trust, after controlling for asset allocation. This is a significant amount, given that the average investment fee is around 60 basis points in our sample. We undertake a benchmarking exercise to reveal that investment fees do not seem excessive, but we again observe differences across funds types. When examining the average difference between the actual investment fee charged and the expected fee, we observe that retail funds have the highest differential.
This report also examines the relationship between investment fees and fund performance. The empirical findings indicate that the most expensive group of funds charge almost three times the investment fee as the least expensive group of funds and that the raw after-fee returns of these funds are significantly greater than the least expensive funds. Part of the higher fees is because these funds hold riskier assets which cost more to manage. We find that the difference in after-fee abnormal performance is not significantly different between the group of funds with the highest and lowest fees. This suggests that investors are no better (or worse) off than they would be if they were to select high or low fee fund during our sample period.
The findings from this report are important for investors and advisors when making informed investment decisions and when allocating funds between superannuation products. It is also relevant for superannuation fund managers when deciding on how to set fees in a competitive setting based on their asset allocations and peer relative performance. For example, funds with low risk allocations are expected to set low fees reflecting the ease of managing such assets. Lastly, the findings from this paper are relevant for policy makers, who in recent years have promoted greater competition in the superannuation industry and placed pressure on funds to reduce fees. Our recommendations from these findings are that investors should be cautious when making investment decisions based solely on fee levels because fees cannot be used to determine the ability and asset allocation decisions of fund managers. Furthermore, fund managers should not be forced to reduce fees to remain competitive, as this may lead to divestment from certain assets classes, which provide higher after-fee returns, thus adversely affecting retirement balances.
Introduction
Excessive fees damage retirement savings dramatically over time once compounding is taken into account. According to David Murray's Financial System Inquiry, the fees charged by superannuation funds in Australia are amongst the highest in the OECD (The Age, Jan 25, 2016) . A recent Grattan Institute report was scathing in its assessment of the fee structure, reporting that many Australians were paying up to three times more than necessary for superannuation (MyWealth, 2014) . This report prompted heated responses from the Head of the Financial Services Council, John Brogden, who accused the Institute of using 'sloppy data'. Typical Australians are also concerned with superannuation fees as demonstrated by treatment of this issue in the mainstream media: in 2014 the Canberra Times reported that the average Australian household spent more on superannuation fees each week than on electricity.
Australian superannuation assets have an aggregate value of over $2 trillion AUD as of the fourth quarter 2015, making it the third largest superannuation industry in the world, behind the USA and the UK. 1 Australia introduced mandatory employer superannuation contributions in 1992 through the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992. As a result, Australia has one of the highest private expenditures on old age pensions in the OECD (3.5% of GDP) and lowest public expenditure (3.5% of GDP, vs an OECD average of 6.5%) (Cook 2012 2 ).
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The question of whether superannuation fees are appropriate is of great importance. Reduction of fees was one of the two significant goals of the Labor Government's (2010-2013) Stronger Super reforms 4 , alongside enhancing efficiency. Given the long investment horizon for superannuation funds, even incremental differences in fees can deliver markedly different retirement outcomes, assuming differences in fees do not generate markedly different returns. Thus, if higher superannuation fund fees are not appropriate for the level of risk/management involved in investments, individuals may not be receiving products that are in the interest of their retirement schemes. Given this is a major goal of the Australian retirement system, the issue is of great significance.
Regulatory bodies in Australia are responsible for ensuring that superannuation fund providers act in the interest of their customers and provide appropriate information regarding their offered products and fees (ASIC 4 ); however, it is considerably more complex to assess whether a management fee is appropriate or not. It is not merely a question of generating higher returns; it is also necessary to consider broader risk characteristics and investment choices of the fund. Further, since a large number of contributions are mandatory employer contributions, there is a significant risk that individuals may not properly monitor their investments in order to make informed decisions.
1 https://www.superannuation.asn.au/resources/superannuation-statistics 2 http://theconversation.com/compulsory-super-its-good-it-works-and-we-want-more-of-it-5975 3 The public/private divide simply relates to the source of funding for old-age benefits. Public pensions refer to any benefits which are funded by government revenue/borrowing (federal, state or local) and these are generally unfunded, Pay As You Go (PAYG) schemes though can include sovereign funds. E.g. The Australian Old Age Pension represents public expenditure and is a PAYG scheme. All other benefits paid to retirees are considered private. In Australia this essentially means superannuation schemes, 401Ks in the US, i.e. most often defined contribution funds. The expenditure is referring to payments/withdrawals made on private pension plans to members and not contributions made into funds by members.
Using data from Chant West this report examines i) the determinants of fees, with a particular focus on investment fees, and ii) whether these higher fees lead to higher returns for superannuation fund members. Based on our findings, we highlight that increased granularity in the disclosure of fees, asset allocation and returns would help superannuation funds members make more informed choices.
Background
The retirement system in Australia has undergone a substantial shift towards superannuation over the past several decades. In 1972, superannuation coverage reached only 29% of employed persons, but grew to 53% by 1982, 71% by 1991 and following compulsory superannuation introduction in 1992, superannuation coverage currently extends to over 90% of employed Australians. Likewise the size of assets under management in the superannuation industry has grown from 38% of GDP in 1991, to over 100% of GDP in 2012. 5 Given the substantial value of the industry, excessive fees can generate substantial welfare losses for Australians. For example, even excessive fees of 10 basis points represent annual losses to Australians of $2 billion dollars, based on $2 trillion worth of assets. These figures put into perspective the importance of ensuring fairness in fees.
MySuper funds were introduced in July 2013 as part of the Stronger Super reforms 6 . MySuper funds are restricted to a single diversified investment strategy, and restricted regarding the types of fees that may be charged. The product is designed to be relatively simple so that members are not forced to pay for unwanted or unnecessary services. Employers are required to make contributions to a MySuper fund for employees who have not indicated a preferred superannuation fund. Due to restrictions on investment strategy and chargeable fees, MySuper funds are aiming to be low cost. Rice Warner's 2014 report into super products predicts that the introduction of MySuper will cause fees to converge to approximately 1% of assets over the next few years. They show that total fees have declined 20 basis points from 2004 to 2014 (Rice Warner, 2015) .
Retail funds are typically high cost funds, though some may offer a low cost MySuper option. Retail funds aim to retain profits for the company managing the fund.
Industry funds are either open for anyone to join, or restricted to employees of a particular industry. Whilst the majority are accumulation funds, some older funds have defined benefit members. The funds are run for the benefit of members, and all profits are reinvested into the fund, making industry funds generally low to mid cost. Some industry funds offer MySuper accounts.
Public Sector funds were created primarily for employees of state and federal Governments. Typical characteristics of these funds are a higher employer contribution rate than the (current) 9.5% minimum, relatively modest range of investment choices, a large proportion of older members with defined benefit funds, generally low fees, and some offer MySuper accounts. Like industry funds, public sector funds are not for profit, with earnings reinvested into the funds for the benefit of all members.
Corporate funds are arranged by employers for employees, or by a Board of Trustees appointed by the employer and employees. Corporate funds can either be directly run by employer/industry or be in the form of retail funds. If corporate funds are managed by retail funds, some profit will be retained by fund managers, whilst for an employer-run or industry fund, profits are usually 5 http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1314/SuperChr on#_Toc382309866 6 http://strongersuper.treasury.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=reforms.htm distributed back to members. Larger corporate funds typically offer a wider range of investment options. Self-Managed Super Funds (SMSF) 7 are managed by members themselves who act as directors/trustees of the fund, and are limited to one to four members in size. Whilst investment choices are quite wide, numerous restrictions typically apply. For example, property investments must meet a 'sole benefit test' of providing only retirement benefits for members, i.e., the property cannot be acquired by a related party of a member, be lived in by a fund member/related parties, and cannot be rented to a fund member or related parties. There are also additional legal costs such as auditing and tax compliance. Since SMSFs do not possess the scale of other types of funds, higher fees are typically incurred unless a substantial amount of money is invested. Figure 1 is based on APRA regulated fund annual data. As of June 2015, there were 232 APRA regulated funds. Retail and rollover funds make up 59.9% of all funds, and represent the for-profit Superannuation sector, with all other funds having not-for-profit status.
Market Share by Superannuation fund type

Figure 1
The distribution looks different when accounting for the fact that retail superannuation providers often provide numerous investment options through several funds. The total number of APRA regulated fund groups by license holders is 133, the breakdown of which is presented below in The total value of assets held by APRA regulated funds in Australia as of June 2015 was approximately $1,233 billion AUD. Corporate funds hold the lowest number of assets per provider, whilst public sector funds have the highest relative assets per provider. The largest 10% of fund providers manage 57.3% of all superannuation assets, which is roughly $707 billion AUD. Around half of these providers are retail funds, a quarter represent industry, a quarter public sector funds, and none are corporate funds.
Investment Styles by Fund Type
As of June 2015 APRA had available fee data for approximately 150 funds. For these funds, the average and median assets per account, fees per account and fees over assets are shown below by different fund types. Public sector funds show the lowest fees as a portion of assets, followed by corporate accounts and retail accounts. Industry account sizes, however, are typically smaller, with fees comparable to retail accounts as a percentage of assets. This is outlined in Table 1 below. Using Chant West's more extensive database, Figure 4 represents the investment style of superannuation funds in 2014. In general, funds invest predominantly in growth assets. Superannuation funds invest predominantly in shares: in total 63.6% of Australian super assets are invested in the stock market. Out of all fund types, retail funds appear to invest significantly more in bonds than other types of assets. The lower return of retail funds examined earlier may be the result of the relatively high level of investment in bonds, which carry lower risk than other assets, i.e., higher returns in other funds may represent compensation for risk. However, given that superannuation funds are generally held over a long horizon, lower risk investments may represent a misallocation of investment. These statistics are shown in Figure 5 below.
Figure 5
Source: Chant West Data
Empirical Research
This report considers two issues that centre on the fees charged by superannuation funds. We first address what the factors are that influence the fees charged by superannuation funds. We undertake this analysis using annual data. The second issue we address is whether funds with that charge higher fees are able to deliver higher performance. This analysis is undertaken with monthly data. The superannuation fund data used in this study are sourced from fund surveys collected by Chant West. 8 Chant West is an independent superannuation research and consultancy firm established in 1997. The sample covers annual data for the period from 2007 to 2015. The data extracted from these surveys include investment fees and administration fees for account balances of $25,000, $50,000 and $250,000. The dataset also includes strategic asset allocation across Australian shares, Australian bonds, international shares, international bonds, Australian property, international property, infrastructure, hedge funds, cash, private equity and other assets. Information on assets under management, fund provider type (i.e., consultants, corporate, industry, master trusts and public sector funds) and an indicator for MySuper funds are also contained in the final dataset.
Determinants of Fees
Data
Summary Statistics
The full sample contains all superannuation funds with observations on the investment fee and the administration fee. The analysis sample includes those superannuation funds for which we have observations on all the fee variables as well the asset allocation of each fund.
We provide two different samples. The first sample is that which includes all funds that have observations on the investment fee and the administration fee (full sample). The final sample that is used in the analysis requires funds to have observations for investment fee, administration fee, asset allocation and fund size (analysis sample). These constraints produce an unbalanced panel of 1,063 annual observations across 174 superannuation fund options. We present the summary statistics for both the full sample and the analysis sample. Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics for both samples. As the statistics for both the full sample and the analysis sample are similar, the discussion will focus on the analysis sample. The average investment fee is just under 62 basis points in our sample. The median is similar, though there is significant variation in the fee within the sample. In terms of the administration fee, these average from 62 basis points on account balances of $25,000 to an average of 16 basis points for account balances of $150,000. The medians are lower for all the administration fees, suggesting that there are some funds charging sizeable administration fees. The maximum values indicate this as well. Investment fees make up 50% of the total fee for account balances of $25,000 and 79% for account balances of $150,000. Table 2 Descriptive Statistics Descriptive statistics are presented for two sample. The Full Sample contains all observations in the Chant West dataset and the Analysis Sample includes those funds with complete data on fees, fund size and asset allocation.
Investment Fee
Administration Fee Total Fee $25,000 $50,000 100,000 $150,000 $25,000 $50,000 $100,000 $150,000 Table 3 presents the mean and median fee for each year from 2007 to 2015. There is considerable variation in investment fees over time, with an increasing trend present up until 2010 followed by some volatility. The median follows a similar pattern. The times series behaviour of the administration fee is essentially the opposite. Administration fees decline over the sample, before increasing from 2013 to 2015. The median results are broadly similar. Table 3 Mean and Median Fees by Year The mean and median of the investment, administration and total fee are reported on an annual basis. The Full Sample contains all observations in the Chant West dataset and the Analysis Sample includes those funds with complete data on fees, fund size and asset allocation. The administration fee and total fee are based on an account balance of $50,000.
Administration Fee $50,000 Total Fee $50,000 
Portfolio Analysis
Despite the absence of any strong trends in the fees charged by the superannuation funds in our sample, we turn our attention to differences in fees in the cross-section of funds and what potential explanations exist. We rank all superannuation funds by their fee and sort them into five portfolios. The ranking is done each year. Table 4 contains the results, with panel A presenting the investment fee sorted portfolio, panel B containing the administration fee sorted portfolios and panel C documenting the results for the total fee-sorted portfolios.
In panel A, the average investment fee for the high investment fee portfolio is almost 91 basis points, which is 57 basis points higher than the 34 basis point investment fee charged by the low fee portfolio. This is an extremely large difference. However, there could be economic justifications for this difference. The administration fee on a $50,000 account balance is not significantly different for funds with higher investment fees. This provides some evidence that investment fee and administration fee are set independently. Not surprisingly, the total fee does vary in a monotonic fashion from the low fee portfolio to the high fee portfolio. A large number of the asset allocations change in a monotonic fashion as expected. Funds with higher investment fees have a lower allocation to cash, Australian bonds and international bonds. Funds with higher investment fees also have a higher allocation to Australian shares, international shares, Australian property, hedge funds, private equity and infrastructure. With the exception of international property, the funds with exposure to asset classes that are either riskier or are more expensive to manage charge higher fees. For example, low fee funds have a 19% allocation to cash whereas high fee funds have a 4% allocation. This 15% difference is roughly the same as the difference in the weights allocated to Australian shares between the low and high fee portfolios, with high fee funds have a larger allocation to shares. At first glance, it seems that fees are in line with expectations given the risk and costs of the various asset classes. However, different investment options have different asset allocations that could influence the investment fee charged. We will return to those differences shortly.
Panel B presents the fees and asset allocations across portfolios sorted by administration fee charged to an investor with a $50,000 account balance. High administration fee portfolios have slightly higher investment fees but the average fee across the portfolios is not monotonic. High administration fee portfolios also have higher total fees. When examining the asset allocations it is evident that funds with higher exposure to the two bond asset classes, international property and hedge funds have higher fees. There is a negative relationship for Australian property, private equity and infrastructure. Although we had no expectation about how administration fees would vary with asset class, it is unexpected that we find some strong relationships. The regression analysis will take into account some other factors that could influence administration fees to ascertain the strength of these portfolio-level relationships.
Panel C contains the analysis for total fees. The investment fee and administration fee increase monotonically with the total fee. The average difference in the total fee is 1.1%, with 75 basis points of this being due to the administration fee and the remaining 35 basis points due to the investment fee. This is a sizeable difference, and does indicate that there is more scope to be lowering administration fees. The variation in total fees is generally consistent with the results of the investment fee sorted portfolios, with riskier asset classes being associated with a higher total fee.
To identify whether it is purely risky assets, or particular asset classes that drive the difference in investment fee, we separate funds into four groups based on their investment option: conservative, balanced, growth and high growth. Within each investment options we sort funds into three groups based on their investment fee, with rebalancing undertaken every year. These average fees and asset allocations are reported in panels A to D of Table 5 . Inspection of the table shows that the investment fee and the portfolio weights in riskier asset classes differ between investment options, as expected. What is apparent is that the difference in fees that exists in the entire sample is present within the investment option groups. The difference in investment fee between the high and low investment fee portfolios ranges from 34 to 43 basis points across the four risk categories. Again, these differences are sizeable. There are some consistent patterns that emerge across each of the four panels. First, within each investment option, those funds that had higher fees all had significantly higher allocations to hedge funds. In all cases, the high fee funds exposure to hedge funds was double that of low fee funds. The allocation to infrastructure is not monotonic within each investment option, but the higher fee funds all have a higher allocation to infrastructure than the low fee funds. The key message here is that higher investment fees are charged by funds that have a higher allocation to less liquid asset classes. The exposure to Australian shares is significant and positive in two of the investment options (Balanced and Growth). This analysis does ignore other influences that could have an impact on fund fees. We now turn our attention to regression analysis to determine if the exposure to the illiquid asset classes can explain the fee differences when other possible explanations are introduced. Table 4 Asset Allocations of Fee-Sorted Portfolios Portfolios are formed by sorting superannuation funds into five portfolios each year based on their investment fee. The mean and median asset allocation for each portfolio is reported as well as the high and low difference. Superannuation funds are ranked into five portfolios each year based on their fee. The portfolios are formed based on three feesinvestment, administration and total. The administration fee and total fee are based on an account balance of $50,000. The three mean fees and the mean asset allocations for each portfolio of superannuation funds are based on the average for the entire sample. The difference between the average of the high fee and low fee group is reported in the High-Low row with the associated t-statistic contained in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively. Table 5 Asset Allocations of Investment Fee-Sorted Portfolios by Risk Category Superannuation funds are separated into groups based on their rick category (conservative, balanced, growth and high growth), and then ranked into three portfolios each year based on their fee. The portfolios are formed based on investment fee. The three mean fees (investment, administration and total) and the mean asset allocations for each portfolio of superannuation funds are based on the average for the entire sample. The difference between the average of the high fee and low fee group is reported in the High-Low row with the associated t-statistic contained in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively. Table 6 presents the total fee determinants regressions results. If we focus directly on column 5 we can observe that almost 70% of the variation in fees is explained by our chosen explanatory variables. Hedge funds and private equity have the greatest impact on total fees, with increased allocations to these illiquid asset classes leading to higher fees paid by fund members. The economies of scale observed in investment fees and administration fees are also present for total fees, not surprisingly. The results from this regression analysis also reveal that after controlling for asset allocation, size, risk category, funds that are classified as being a MySuper fund do not charge significantly different fees from choice funds (i.e. non-MySuper funds). This result is somewhat surprising given that MySuper funds are intended to be a low-cost default alternative for investors who do not make an active fund choice. Given the significantly higher administration and investment fees charged by retail funds, the total fees charged are also higher. In fact, they are 66 basis points higher than industry funds total fees. Industry fund fees are around 11 to 12 basis points higher than corporate or public sector funds. It is clear from the analysis thus far, that any investigation of why fees in Australian superannuation are high, if indeed they are, needs to start by focusing on the fees of retail providers. Table 6 Determinants of Total Fees The dependent variable is the total fee (investment plus administration) in percent based on an account balance of $50,000. The independent variables included are separate indicator variables that are equal to one for a given fund type and zero otherwise. These variables are included for master trusts, consultants, corporate and public sector funds. Industry funds are the reference fund type. Separate indicator variables are included that are equal to one for a given risk category type and zero otherwise. These variables are included for conservative, growth and high growth risk categories. Funds with a balanced option are the reference risk category. The remaining independent variables are fundlevel asset allocations measured in percent, the natural log of net assets under management for the superannuation fund (Size) and an indicator variable equal to one is the fund is classified as a MySuper fund, or zero, otherwise (MySuper). Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. All regressions are with standard errors clustered at the fund level. tstatistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively. 
Fee
Fee Determinants
(1)(2)
Expected Fees
We undertake a benchmarking exercise of funds' investment fees to ascertain whether this component of fees is higher than expected given the asset allocation of a particular fund. The actual investment fee is compared to a benchmark fee that is obtained using the asset allocation of each fund and the estimated fee for each asset class. The estimated fees are based on the information contained in the Mercer (2014) Global Asset Manager Fee Survey 2014. We select wholesale fees for the various asset classes. These fees are detailed in the results section. It is important to note that we include some sensitivity analysis by examining four fee scenarios to ensure that our results are not driven by one specific set of investment fees.
We focus on the investment fee charged in 2014. Table 7 has the benchmark fee levels for the different asset classes for which we have data. We use four different scenarios and vary certain fees across these scenarios. These scenarios are designed to provide robustness to the analysis. Table 7 Estimated Benchmark Fees The benchmark fees for each asset class are estimated based on information contained in the from the Mercer (2014) 'Global Asset Manager Fee Survey 2014'. We vary some fees across the four different scenarios for robustness. The results from our benchmarking exercise are contained in Table 8 . We report the mean results in panel A and the median results in panel B. The results are sensitive to the scenario chosen. Scenario 1 shows that fees are in line with expectations for retail and industry funds, but are lower for corporate and public sector funds. Scenario 2 has all funds having lower fees than expected. Compared to scenario 1, this scenario has a 5 basis point lower fee on cash but a 70 basis point higher fee on private equity and hedge funds. It is clear that the fee paid to these illiquid asset managers is extremely important in explaining the overall investment fee. Scenario 3 lowers the expected fee on hedge funds and private equity back to that in scenario 1 (1.8%). The fees on international equity and fixed income asset classes are lowered to be equivalent to their domestic counterparts. These changes result in the average fee of all fund types being larger than expected. Scenario 4 uses lower fees for Australian and international property, leading to higher than expected fees for industry and retail funds. It is clear that excessiveness of investment fees is sensitive to the assumed fee for each asset class. We have two conclusions to draw from the analysis. First, it seems that in general, investment fees are not too high, on average. We acknowledge that there is variation in each fund category. Second, the ordering of the fee differential is consistent across all four scenarios. Corporate and public sector charge the lowest investment fee, followed by industry funds, with retail funds charging a higher fee than expected, on average. This is consistent with our regression analysis that retail funds are more expensive. One caveat that we need to point out is based on the median results in panel B. Here, the difference between the actual fee and the benchmark fee is not of a consistent sign when comparing retail funds and industry funds. This suggests that there are some retail funds that are charging excessive fees that are increasing the average for this category. Table 8 The Deviation of Actual Investment Fees from their Benchmark This table calculates a benchmark investment fee for each fund using its asset allocation and the fee scenarios in Error! Reference source not found.. The mean and median for the benchmark fee and the actual fee are calculated with the results reporting the difference between the actual and the benchmark fee. * and ** indicate statistical significance at 5 and 1%, respectively. The statistical significance is based on a t-test for the means and a signed rank test for the medians. 
Asset
Fund
Limitations
There are two shortcomings to this study. First, we do not have data on the universe of superannuation funds. We believe that the availability of asset allocation data far outweighs the cost of only examining a smaller sample of superannuation funds. Second, the heterogeneity of investors makes it difficult to examine qualitative factors that will impact administration fees. The provision of services, such as financial advice, may not be in the best interests of all members as many will not utilise these services. Therefore, the fee charged by a fund may be reasonable for one member, but not for a different member. The approach we take is to exclude qualitative factors from our analysis, given the value derived is subjective.
Fees and Return Relationship
The fee-performance analysis uses monthly data to identify whether higher fee funds earn higher returns. Table 9 reports summary statistics for our fund universe split into five groups by investment fee size. Every month we have on average 132 funds reporting and thus about 26 to 27 funds in each fee quintile group. Average investment fees p.a. in the low fee group is 0.63 percent. High-fee groups charge almost triple (0.95 percent) that of the low-fee group (0.34 percent). Median investment fees are similar to the averages. MySuper funds comprise 6 percent of our sample with noticeably fewer MySuper funds in the low-fee group of 3 percent compared with 7 percent in the high-fee group.
9 Industry funds (45 percent) and master trusts (27 percent) dominate the entire sample. However, these funds make up less of the low-fee group. Corporate and Public Sector funds are more predominant in the lowest fee group than in the highest fee group.
On the asset allocation of funds, overall on average 26 percent is in Australian shares, 23 percent in international shares, 10 percent in cash, 21 percent in fixed interest and 12 percent in alternative assets. Moving from the lowest to highest fee group there is a noticeable pattern of low-fee groups holding less risky asset classes of bonds and cash while high-fee groups hold the riskier assets of Australian shares, international shares and alternative assets. The benchmark indices that we use are in Appendix 1. Appendix 2 reports the average monthly variable and also the mean difference between the Full and Filtered; and IFee and Filtered sample (with t-stats). The variables are the investment fee, monthly fund return and dummies for each fund type (consultants, corporate, industry, master trusts and public sector funds). Note that the investment fee is not calculated for the full sample as not all funds have the investment fee populated. We find that our filtered sample has a statistically significant, 0.003% higher investment fee than the IFee sample and statistically indistinguishable returns from the Full or IFee sample. In terms of fund type compositions, our filtered sample has between 0.8 to 1.5 percent more consultants, corporate and master trusts than the Full sample or IFee sample. Overall, we conclude that our sample is representative of the Chant West universe.
Our research in the paper Superannuation Fund Performance and Fund Fees examines the relationship between fund performance and fund fee levels. This is of great utility when attempting to benchmark funds' performance and determine whether their fees are fair relative to their return.
Using a comprehensive dataset of for-profit, not-for-profit, default and non-default Australian superannuation fund options, we show there to be a positive relationship between investment fees and after-fee returns, and that high-fee funds on average produce significantly higher returns than low-fee funds. However, after adjusting returns for benchmark indices and asset pricing factors, we fail to observe a relationship between fund performance and fees, and as such, high-fee funds are shown to perform indifferently from low-fee funds on a benchmark-adjusted basis and after fees. These findings are largely unaffected by the inclusion of administration fees and are best explained by high-fee funds having allocated a higher proportion of their assets to growth investments, which are typically more expensive to manage and are inherently more risky relative to conservative assets. Tables 10 and 11 highlight our findings.
Table 10 Unadjusted Returns of Fee-sorted Portfolios
Superannuation funds are sorted into quintiles according to one-month lagged investment fee, over the period from April 2007 to March 2015, and are rebalanced monthly. Quintile one contains the lowest-fee funds and quintile five are the highest-fee funds. Mean monthly unadjusted fund returns and average investment fees across the sample period are reported for each quintile in both panels. Portfolio returns and investment fees are equal-weighted across each quintile. The difference in mean monthly unadjusted returns, and investment fees, between the high-fee and low-fee quintiles is also reported in each Panel. The equal-weighted mean fund return and investment fee for all funds contained is also reported. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively, for the null hypothesis that portfolio returns are different from zero. The Low portfolio holds funds with the lowest fees, and High contain the highest-fee quintile of funds. A long-short portfolio that is long the highest-fee quintile of funds and short the lowest-fee quintile of funds, and a portfolio containing all the funds in the sample, are also examined. The AAB model formulates a special market index AAB for each individual fund based on passive asset-class indices and the constituent funds' one-month lagged value-weighted actual allocation to each of the respective asset classes. The asset-class indices used are listed in Appendix 2. All index returns are measured in excess of the risk-free asset. Alpha is the intercept term which represents the abnormal return of the fund portfolio respective to the regressions model. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively. 
Fee
Implications for Policy
Based on our research, we believe that additional disclosure requirements should be placed on superannuation funds. In addition to the already disclosed asset allocation, we propose that superannuation funds should:
1. Disclose the returns earned for each asset class; 2. Disclose the investment fee charged for each asset class; 3. The proportion of each asset class that is passively managed These requirements will facilitate an improved flow of information to superannuation fund members that will assist them in gaining a better understanding of their investment performance. This proposed disclosure will allow analysts and ratings companies an opportunity to benchmark superannuation funds performance across different asset classes in a more rigorous manner that is currently possible using publicly available information. It will make it much easier for performance to be compared on a risk-adjusted basis. Furthermore, this disclosure will allow for investment fees to be accurately benchmarked. It will allow members to identify where fees are eroding their account balance and if they think that fee is worthy of the return it is generating. The final proposal will help address concerns that superannuation funds are not making use of passive investment management in those asset classes where there active managers, on average, do not outperform their benchmarks. This information is an important piece of the fee-performance puzzle that we have not been able to address in our research. Going forward, we believe it is important that members are able to get an improved understanding of how their superannuation is being invested, where their returns are coming from and what fees they are incurring in the process.
Conclusion
The fees charged by superannuation funds remains a hotly debated issue in Australia. Our fee determinant research indicates that many funds are charging a fee premium even after accounting for various other factors such as asset allocation and liquidity of assets. We document that the investment fees charged by superannuation funds can be partially explained by the funds' exposure to illiquid asset classes, such as private equity and hedge funds. Given the holding period of superannuation fund members is likely to be relatively long, it would appear reasonable for superannuation funds to attempt to capture the illiquidity premiums that have historically been available in these asset classes. After controlling for the asset allocations of superannuation funds, we find that the type of fund also has a significant influence on the investment fee charged. Master Trusts charge significantly higher fees than industry funds. The difference is in the order of 11 basis points after taking differences in asset allocation and choice of investment option into account. These results suggests that certain superannuation funds should be able to lower fees to benefit their members.
We find a positive relationship between investment fees and after-fee returns, and that high fee funds on average produce significantly higher returns than low-fee funds. However, after adjusting returns for benchmark indices and asset pricing factors, we fail to observe a relationship between fund performance and fees, and as such high fee funds are shown to perform indifferently from low fee funds on a benchmark-adjusted basis and after fees. These finding are largely unaffected by the inclusion of administration fees. The most likely explanation for this is the allocation by high fee funds of a higher proportion of assets to growth investments, which are typically more expensive to manage and are inherently more risky relative to conservative assets.
Based on our findings, we have proposed we have outlined a number of potential reforms to enhance disclosure and transparency within the industry. We believe these changes will have lasting benefits to members of superannuation funds as they will allow for more informed conclusions to be drawn regarding the fees that they are paying and the performance their assets are generating.
Comparison of Categories and Returns of Filtered Sample with Full Sample
The table reports summary statistics for the Chant West sample populated by monthly returns ('Full' sample), Chant West sample populated with monthly returns and investment fees ('IFee' sample) and the filtered sample that we use populated by monthly returns, investment fees and lagged month strategic asset allocation ('Filtered' sample'). Every month for each sample, the equal weighted variable (e.g. investment fee) across funds is calculated. The table reports the average monthly variable and also mean difference between the Full and Filtered; and IFee and Filtered sample (with t-stats). The variables are investment fee, monthly fund return and dummies for each fund type (consultants, corporate, industry, master and public sector funds). Note that investment fee is not calculated for the full sample as not all funds have investment fee populated. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively. 
